TRUMP-KIM SUMMIT

So the Trump-Kim Summit is off. Or is it? I think it is, at least for now. Still, NK has made unpredictability an art form and when dealing with Pyongyang its never over until it is over and sometimes not even then.

Of course, in this case it was Trump who called it off. But he too prides himself on unpredictability and whatever you can accuse him of, you cannot accuse him of being afraid to change his mind.

NK has said it is still open to talking to the US. Trump’s letter was not aggressive or hostile in its tone — which was more in sorrow than in anger — and the cancellation was not unqualified: a meeting was inappropriate “at this time”.

I am not holding my breath, but the fat lady hasn’t sung yet, at least to my ear. In the meantime, there two new realities.

First, NK has gained recognition as a de facto nuclear weapon state. It would never have denuclearised anyway, but its resolve to remain one must have been strengthened.

White House officials have been quoted as saying that NK just did not turn up for preparatory meetings without any explanation. Did KJU have second thoughts? Perhaps. If he did it must have been after several senior members of the Trump administration talked about the ‘Libya model’.

For those who may not remember, after Gaddafi gave up his rudimentary nuclear programme, Libya was attacked, regime change effected, and Gaddafi killed. I am sure whoever else may have forgotten, KJU remembered. NK in fact often uses the Libya analogy to justify why it must have nuclear weapons. The hostile rhetoric that Trump used to justify calling off the meeting came after his people talked about the Libya model.

Secretary of State Pompeo said about a week ago that the main US interest was to get rid of long-range ICBMs that can reach the continental US. There was always only a ghost of a chance that NK would have agreed; now there is absolutely no chance.

Abe must be relieved. Giving up long-range ICBMs would have left Pyongyang with a lot of medium range missiles capable of reaching Japan. But this is only a respite not a reprieve for Japan. The inherent logic of the security dilemma it is in does not change.

Second, assuming that NK does not immediately resume missile or nuclear tests, it is going to be extremely difficult to enhance sanctions against NK. After all it was not Pyongyang who called off the summit and NK said that it was willing to discuss denuclearisation. It has not taken that back.

China will not go along with enhanced sanctions and now has every incentive to relax its implementation of existing sanctions or turn a blind eye if they are circumvented.

Trump accused Xi of persuading KJU to take a more hostile tone which manifested itself after Kim met Xi the second time. But correlation is not causation. We will never know what happened but the record of NK-China relations under KJU is not one that suggests that KJU listens to Xi unless it suits his purposes. At any rate, it is clear that China was ambivalent about the summit.

So where does this leave the issue? We are more or less back where we were last year. Deterrence will hold and diplomacy to stabilise deterrence has not yet been entirely ruled out.

And remember, I don’t think the fat lady has sung yet. We are only at the beginning of the beginning of the beginning of a very long process.