The Singaporean who was caught spying for China was a PhD candidate under "Chinese agent of influence" Huang Jing , Singapore's retired diplomat Bilahari Kausikan revealed on Facebook on Saturday, July 25.

Yeo might have been recruited by Chinese government while in LKYSPP

In his post, Bilahari referred to the Singaporean man, Dickson Yeo Jun Wei, as a "fool" who can "get all Singaporeans suspected" for being Chinese agents of influence by the United States government.

He then edited his post subsequently to say he learnt that China-born American academic Huang Jing was Yeo's PhD supervisor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (LKYSPP).

Singapore then "threw him out", referring to Huang's deportation.

Bilahari wrote: "It is not unreasonable to assume he was recruited or at least talent spotted by the MSS (China's Ministry of State Security) there."

Huang was a professor of U.S.-China relations at the LKYSPP, where he worked from 2008 to 2017, while Yeo enrolled for a PhD at the postgraduate school in 2015.

Country Huang was spying for not revealed by Singapore previously

Huang's permanent residence in Singapore was cancelled in 2017 after he was identified as an agent of influence of a foreign country.

It was not revealed at that time whether he was a foreign agent of China or the U.S.

Huang later said he worked for a year in Washington D.C. after he was expelled from Singapore, in order to prove that he is "not what Singapore implied" he was.

He is now the dean of the Institute of International and Regional Studies at Beijing Language and Culture University.

Background

Yeo, 39, pleaded guilty on Friday, July 24, to one count of acting within the U.S. as "an illegal agent of a foreign power without first notifying the Attorney General", the U.S. Department of Justice said.

Yeo admitted that he "not only provided valuable information to Chinese intelligence, but also that he knowingly recruited others in the U.S. to do the same".

He also admitted that he "accepted, conducted, and followed through on taskings" for the Chinese government with "a full appreciation of what he was doing".

According to court documents, Yeo was recruited by "various individuals who claimed to represent PRC-based think tanks" after a presentation he gave on Southeast Asian politics in Beijing.

Yeo was offered money in exchange for political reports and information.

He later learnt that at least four of these individuals were intelligence operatives for the PRC government.

One of them offered Yeo a contract with the PRC People's Liberation Army later on, but Yeo had refused to sign it.

However, he continued to work for the PRC government.

Yeo instructed to gather "scuttlebutt" sort of information

Yeo was instructed to provide the PRC Chinese intelligence service (PRCIS) operatives with "non-public information", information that they referred to as "scuttlebutt", which means rumour or gossip.

While the tasks were focused on Southeast Asia at first, they shifted to become focused on the U.S.

The PRCIS operatives used pseudonyms in their interactions with Yeo, but did not hide their affiliation with the PRC government.

Yeo met with PRCIS operatives in various locations across China -- he met one of his PRCIS contacts about 19 to 20 times, and another about 25 times.

When he travelled to China for these meetings, he was regularly taken out of the customs line and brought to a separate office for entry into the country.

While Yeo raised this issue with a PRCIS operative, the latter told Yeo they wanted to conceal his identity when he travelled to China.

Used LinkedIn to recruit targets

Yeo used social media and "a professional networking website that is focused on career and employment information" to find and recruit U.S. citizens who could provide him information.

A person familiar with the case told The Washington Post that the website was LinkedIn.

In 2018, under the instruction of PRCIS operatives, Yeo created a fake consulting company that used the same name as prominent U.S. consulting firm, Resolute Consulting, that conducts public and government relations.

Yeo received over 400 resumes, and about 90 per cent of the resumes were from U.S. military and government personnel with security clearances.

After he contacted potential targets online, LinkedIn began throwing up additional potential contacts.

The website's algorithm was relentless, Yeo said.

He checked the site almost every day to review the new batch of potential contacts suggested to him by the site's algorithm.

He later told U.S. law enforcement that it felt "almost like an addiction".

Paid 3 individuals for reports

Yeo received guidance from his PRCIS contacts on how to recruit potential targets, such as asking them if they were dissatisfied with work, having financial troubles, had children to support, and whether they had a good rapport with Yeo.

He managed to recruit multiple U.S. citizens who provided him with information.

He also managed to ask three individuals to write reports for him.

Yeo paid them about US$1,000 to US$2,000 (S$1,382 to S$2,765) for each report.

He told the individuals the reports were meant for clients in Asia, without revealing that they were actually sent to the Chinese government.

Person 1 was a civilian working with the U.S. Air Force. He confided to Yeo that he was having financial troubles.

The report he wrote for Yeo contained information about the geopolitical implications of Japan purchasing the F-35 aircraft from the U.S.

Person 2 was an officer in the U.S. Army who was assigned to the Pentagon at that time.

Yeo managed to build a good rapport with him.

Person 2 confided to Yeo that he was traumatised by his military tours in Afghanistan.

The report he wrote for Yeo contained information on how the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Afghanistan would impact China.

Yeo told him the reports were meant for clients in South Korea and other Asian countries, and did not reveal that they would be sent to a foreign government instead.

Person 3 was employed at the U.S. Department of State at the time when Yeo reached out to him.

He confided to Yeo that he was feeling dissatisfied at work and was having financial issues. He also said he was worried about his upcoming retirement.

The report he wrote for Yeo was on a then-serving member of the U.S. cabinet.

Made contact with individuals at various events

Under the instruction of PRCIS operatives, Yeo travelled to the U.S. to continue his efforts.

He stayed in Washington, D.C. from around January 2019 to July 2019, where he attended multiple events and speaking engagements at D.C.-area think tanks.

He made contact with several individuals from lobbying firms and defence contracting companies.

PRCIS operatives directed Yeo not to communicate with them when he travelled to the U.S. for fear the U.S. government would intercept their communications.

One of his contacts instructed him that if he must email them from the U.S., he should do so from a local coffee shop.

Another PRCIS contact told him not to take his phone and notebooks when travelling to the U.S.

He also gave Yeo a bank card so Yeo could pay his American contacts for the information they provided.

When Yeo was outside the U.S., they communicated via the encrypted Chinese messaging app WeChat.

Yeo was told to use multiple phones and to change his WeChat account each time he contacted the PRCIS operatives.

He faces a maximum of 10 years imprisonment and will be sentenced on Oct. 9.

U.S.: Chinese government continues to target Americans with sensitive government information

Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers said Yeo was "yet another example of the Chinese government's exploitation of the openness of American society".

He said that Yeo's guilty plea "underscores the ways that the Chinese government continues to target Americans with access to sensitive government information, including using the Internet and non-Chinese nationals to target Americans who never leave the U.S."

"We will continue to prosecute those who use deceptive practices on the Internet and elsewhere to undermine our national security.”

Top image adapted via Dickson Yeo's Facebook & Xinhua