By Bilahari Kausikan
Ambassador Bilahari Kausikan (pictured above right) is Policy Advisor with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and former Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. He was one of the main Singaporean voices in the "Asian values" during the early 1990s, publishing commentaries such as "Governance That Works"; "Asia's Different Standard"; and "East Asian Approaches to Human Rights".
This is an excerpt of a speech, "The Idea of Asia", given at the Singapore Writers Festival held on Nov. 1, 2014.
Asia as a political concept
‘Asia’ is a political and not just a geographic concept; it is politics that defines geography. ‘East Asia’ once meant China, Japan, the Koreas, Mongolia and sometimes, Vietnam, essentially the Sinocentric civilizational area centered on what we now call Northeast Asia.
But East Asia now routinely includes Southeast Asia, recognition of the growing political, economic, diplomatic linkages, and hence the interests that have developed between ASEAN and Northeast Asia and the success of ASEAN in creating various platforms that reflect such linkages and form the diplomatic arena where competition and cooperation play themselves out.
With the formation and subsequent expansion of one of these platforms, the East Asian Summit, the definition of East Asia now includes not just India, but also countries not generally regarded as ‘Asian’ such as the US, Australia and New Zealand as well as Russia. The definition of East Asia could well be stretched further as interests change.
Asia as a political concept has a history stretching back to at least the late 19th century. I do not intend to bore you with a recitation of every manifestation and I want to instead focus on the most recent phase in the evolution of the concept of Asia that began in the early 1990s. The notion of Asia that arose in the early 1990s was entangled with and indeed can hardly be distinguished from, the debate over Asian values that not coincidentally, arose at the same time. This is a debate that is far more often talked about than understood. As someone who played a minor role in it, let me give you my perspective.
Concept of Asia in the early 1990s
[quipbox float="right" boxcolor="000000" boxhead="What the Asian values rhetoric was really for: Take the heat off China"]
No one was under any illusion that we could change minds. Our aim was the modest one of buying some time for the passions of a new administration to cool and common sense and the imperatives of realpolitik to prevail.
Geopolitical concerns were the main reason for us. By the end of the 1980s, the potential for geopolitical complications was high, arising from a combination of factors: end of Cold War; consequent Western/American triumphalism; China just beginning to take off as a serious challenge to the West; both US and China freed from constraints of a de facto anti-Soviet alliance, and an inexperienced US administration – until Clinton was elected in 1993, Democrats had been out of power for 25 years except for the untypical four years under Carter which even Democrats were eager to forget – that seemed more than merely inclined to structure its relationship with China on the basis of the promotion of democracy and human rights. This is the one area that the Chinese leadership would never compromise, as the 1989 Tiananmen incident clearly demonstrated. But Tiananmen also encouraged the new administration to take a hard line towards China. During the campaign, Clinton accused his predecessor of “coddling dictators”
Why were we concerned? US-China relations are the most important axis of East Asian international relations, affecting the entire region. When they are stable the region is calm; when US-China relations are roiled, the entire region is unsettled. And the approach towards China apparently preferred by the new administration promised a rocky ride for the entire region so we entered the debate to try and encourage a more complex view of the issue. No one was under any illusion that we could change minds. Our aim was the modest one of buying some time for the passions of a new administration to cool and common sense and the imperatives of realpolitik to prevail. In the meantime, if the new administration needed to work their campaign rhetoric out of their system, it was better that they had a broader target than just China.
The immediate locus of the debate was developments leading up to 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights, particularly the Asian Group preparatory meeting held in Bangkok in April 1993. Article 8 of the Bangkok Declaration that emerged out of that meeting was the eye of the storm: “[Ministers and representatives of Asian governments] recognise that while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds”.
The Bangkok meeting was split on the core issue of the universality or otherwise of human rights and democracy as a political form, the basic division being roughly between the more western oriented members like Japan and South Korea, and countries like Iran and China, with the majority somewhere in the middle. I played some role in drafting the language of Article 8 which was eventually accepted as a compromise. The approach I took was historical and was intended to be, and indeed I still believe, is no more than a simple statement of fact. The idea of "democracy", always a protean term, has evolved, as has the definition of specific rights. And they will continue to change in response to specific developments and not necessarily only in one direction either... Most rights are essentially contested concepts, even something as fundamental as the right to life.
[quipbox float="right" boxcolor="000000" boxhead="Asian values debate becomes fodder for those who did not understand it"]
Once common sense reasserted itself, we -- and most other countries -- ceased to play an active role in the debate which was then of interest primarily to the chattering and scribbling classes who did not really understand what the debate was really about in the first place.
Of course all countries hold some values in common, but the commonalities are at such a high level of generality that they generally prescribe nothing of practical significance for how different countries formulate specific policies to solve specific problems or organize themselves. The empirical evidence of our senses is that diversity rather than universality is the most salient characteristic of the world we actually live in as distinct from the world regarded through ideological lens of one sort or another.
To cut a long story short, eventually common sense did prevail and the US and China began again to deal with each other as great powers usually do, that is, pragmatically. US-China relations are too complex to be otherwise. In fact the very complexity of the relationship, the necessity of balancing the multiplicity of interests that characterises the relationship against each other, sets up a dynamic that propels a movement towards the centre. And this holds true whether one starts from the first premise of human rights and democracy as did the first Clinton administration, or from the first premise of the reality of strategic competition, as did the first Bush ’43 administration.
The only questions are how long it will take to reach equilibrium and what collateral damage the two major powers and the rest of us will have to endure in the process. Once common sense reasserted itself, we -- and most other countries -- ceased to play an active role in the debate which was then of interest primarily to the chattering and scribbling classes who did not really understand what the debate was really about in the first place.
"Asian values" debate has moved on to a debate over an architecture that will define East Asia
[quipbox float="right" boxcolor="000000" boxhead="US-China relations a central pillar for rest of Asia"]
When Washington and Beijing reach a new modus vivendi, a new concept of Asia will emerge and we will all have to live with it.
However, we are now in the midst of a renewed debate over the idea of Asia in a different and I think more complex form. It is no longer a relatively simple debate over values, but a more nuanced debate over the architecture that will define East Asia. Again the geopolitical driver is US-China relations. Washington and Beijing are currently groping towards a new equilibrium, a new modus vivendi, in their relationship with each other and with other countries in East Asia. Post WW II East Asia was very largely an American creation because it was the US that provided the stability that was the foundation of the growth that is the most salient common characteristic of an otherwise highly diverse region. In this sense the US is an East Asian state or at least an Asia-Pacific state, a concept that now shares a very large common space with the idea of Asia.
But there is now a consensus across the region that while the US is still a very necessary condition for stability, it is no longer a sufficient condition and the US presence needs to be supplemented – supplemented not supplanted – by some new architecture to preserve stability for growth. This consensus is shared by both China and the US, even though their rhetoric sometimes suggests otherwise. The search for this new architecture is the core strategic issue for our region. No one knows what shape it will take or how long it will take, although I think it will be a work of decades and not just a few years. But US-China relations will certainly be the central pillar around which any new architecture will eventually be erected, and when Washington and Beijing reach a new modus vivendi, a new concept of Asia will emerge and we will all have to live with it.
At present, the main choices are between an essentially Sinocentric architecture built around the ASEAN plus One Dialogue with China with elements of the APT incorporated, or a more open construct built around the EAS. But these are by no means the only choices and the situation is still evolving. No one as yet really can predict the final outcome. ASEAN is at the centre of this and has been able to establish platforms that could play a supplementary role in channelling US-China relations in more predictable and constructive directions, because US and Chinese interests intersect in Southeast Asia; ASEAN is a relatively neutral body friendly to both; and both the US and China find it useful to use these ASEAN-created platforms. This minimal role is useful but will not be the decisive factor. Whether ASEAN can continue to play even such a role depends on whether it can remain relatively neutral and that in turn depends on the future of its integration project, particularly economic integration.
[quipbox float="right" boxcolor="000000" boxhead="China's re-emergence a threat to Western myth of universality"]
China’s re-emergence as a major power has been disquieting to many in the West because it challenges in a very fundamental way the Western myth of universality. That myth could only be sustained by a Western dominance that is now ebbing.
The adjustments between the US and China that will have to be made are manifold. I want to focus on just one aspect that I think is most germane to the subject of our discussion. This is what can be termed the psychological.
China’s re-emergence as a major power has been disquieting to many in the West because it challenges in a very fundamental way the Western myth of universality. That myth could only be sustained by a Western dominance that is now ebbing. Yet universality is a mode of thought that the West inherited from its monotheistic and teleological Christian traditions, but is now deeply embedded in even the most secular of western societies. That mode of thought is not going to disappear even if real power is being redistributed.
The idea that certain political forms are the necessary result of certain historical processes and correlated with certain types of economic systems, is one that China fundamentally challenges because in China capitalism flourishes without liberal democracy, and unlike say, Japan, China only wants to be China and has no real desire to be an honorary member of the West.
These are not abstract intellectual considerations because in recent times the idea of the universality of certain values and political forms has been used to justify military interventions to change regimes in North Africa and the Middle East. Of course, no one really believes that China is going to be subject to such kinetic interventions which have been deployed only against the weak, and of course much of western and specifically American rhetoric about human rights and democracy, is only that – mere rhetoric. Yet it is also an essential part of the American sense of self and is never ever going away, even if it’s most ridiculous and extreme forms such as the idea that history had come to an end are now smothered in an embarrassed silence. It is at very least an additional complication to the already complex adjustments that are underway in US-China relations.
Nor are all interventions military, and East Asia has experienced more than its fair share of various attempts to influence the domestic politics of states. In any case, the words of a great power echo far more loudly than may be intended and not every Western leader sufficiently understand that words spoken for domestic reasons or to preserve amour propre, can have strategic consequences.
Statecraft defined by a western defined modernity
[quipbox float="right" boxcolor="000000" boxhead="It's not as simple as a slogan"]
I am not a great believer in the idea of a clash of civilizations. Nor do I believe that the adjustments that are underway in East Asia can be understood by simplistic slogans like ‘Asia rising, the West declining’.
Let me conclude with one final point. I am not a great believer in the idea of a clash of civilizations. Nor do I believe that the adjustments that are underway in East Asia can be understood by simplistic slogans like ‘Asia rising, the West declining’. The patterns of trade, finance and investments that have developed as a result of Asian growth, are too complex to be defined by geographical dichotomies.
For the last two hundred years the key issue faced by the non-western world is how to adapt to a Western defined modernity. The most successful examples of adaption are East Asian. Since the 1911 overthrow of the Qing Dynasty, China has undergone a series of westernizing political experiments of which the current blend of communism with the market economy is the most recent and the most successful. Communism too is a Western ideology, and we should not lose sight of the fact that both liberal democracy as practiced in the West and CPC rule have the same intellectual roots and are both legitimate heirs to the 18th century political philosophy that locates sovereignty in the notion of ‘the people’ rather than in Divine Right, bloodline or some other principle.
Almost all political systems today validate themselves by some variant of that 18th century political philosophy. We may have preferences for one kind of system or another, but it is difficult to say in abstract that one is more legitimate than another. In the realm of practical statecraft, success is the ultimate virtue.